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Constitutional Law-Criminal

Law-CRIMINAL PROSECUTION SUBSE-

QUENT TO JUVENILE COURT ADJUDICATORY HEARING CONSTITUTES DOUBLE

JEOPARDY-Breed v. Jones, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).

In the late nineteenth century, the juvenile court system was established
in this country to deal with youths who had committed criminal offenses,
were likely to do so, or were otherwise in need of state supervision.' Contrary to the criminal system, the juvenile courts began with articulated
goals of treatment and rehabilitation.' In theory, the state, acting through
the juvenile system and under the doctrine of parenspatriae,would shield
the juvenile from the harsh reality of the criminal courts by placing him
within a paternalistic judicial framework with a vast spectrum of remedies
and a minimum of procedural formalities.'
Since juvenile proceedings were conceptualized as civil in nature, the
constitutional protection afforded criminal defendants was deemed inappropriate.' Moreover, the application of constitutional guarantees to the
juvenile courts was viewed as an impediment to the system's goals of
maintaining an informal decorum, providing flexibility in approach and
remedy, and acting in the child's best interests.' So long as the juvenile
system was theoretically geared to provide treatment and rehabilitation,
there existed a quid pro quo for the lack of constitutional protection afforded juveniles.'
1. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV.
104, 107 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Mack]; R. MENNEL, THoRNs AD TmSTLEs 132 (1973).
2. [T]he child who has begun to go wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a
law or an ordinance, is to be taken in hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a
protector, as the ultimate guardian ....
Mack, supra note 1, at 107.
See also Ex parte Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908). Cf. Ex parte Liddel, 93 Cal. 633, 29
P. 251 (1892).
3. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STA. L. REv. 1187, 1193
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Fox]. See also Mack, supranote 1, at 109.
4. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); S. DAVIs, RiGHTs OF JUVENILES: THE JUVE
JUSTCE SYsTEM 3 (1974).
5. The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in such hearings. The
judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy at the bar, can never evoke a proper
sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on
occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while
losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.
Mack, supra note 1, at 120.
6. To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of crime
• . . the Legislature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child . . . by
bringing it into one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for the purpose
of subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection. Commonwealth v. Fisher,
213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905) (emphasis added).
See also In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); Fox, supra note 3, at 1238-39.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:201

In the 1967 landmark decision In re Gault,' the Supreme Court recognized that the juvenile system was not fulfilling its goals.' The Court
responded by making certain fundamental due process guarantees applicable to delinquency proceedings.' Three years later, the Court in In re
Winship"° ruled that the quantum of proof necessary to adjudicate a child
"delinquent" must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. While the Court
in both Gault and Winship made criminal procedural safeguards applicable to juvenile proceedings, it was careful to assert that the imposition of
these safeguards would not impair the juvenile system's benevolent aspects."
In determining whether a constitutional right should attach in juvenile
proceedings, the Court has developed a two-tiered analytical framework.
First, the Court weighs the importance of the right to the juvenile in terms
of the protection and benefits its application will afford him and the detrimental effects its denial is precipitating. Second, the Court considers the
effect on the system's flexibility and paternalistic goals caused by the
application of the constitutional right.
This balancing approach was employed in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania'
where the Court ruled that the due process clause does not assure the right
to trial by jury in a delinquency proceeding. The ramifications of injecting
juries into the juvenile system were perceived by the Court to outweigh any
benefits to be garnered by the juvenile.'3 The Court's conclusion affirmed
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. For example, the Court noted that the "term [delinquent] has come to involve only
slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to adults." Id. at 24. The Court stated
that "[t]he high rate of juvenile recidivism casts some doubt upon the adequacy of treatment
afforded juveniles." Id. at 23 n.30. Moreover, the Court discovered that in "about one-half of
the States, a juvenile may be transferred to an adult penal institution afte a juvenile court
has found him 'delinquent'." Id. at 20 n.26.
The Court's initial disenchantment with the juvenile system surfaced one year prior to
Gault. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
9. The juvenile was afforded the right to receive adequate notice of the charges against him
and the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses at the delinquency hearing.
10. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
11. In Gault, the Court stated that "the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967). The Court in Winship expressed similar sentiments:
"Nor do we perceive any merit in the argument that to afford juveniles the protection of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt would risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile process." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970).
12. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
13. The Court stated:
There is a possibility . . . that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional
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that it was not willing to destroy the system's separate identity by applying
to it all constitutional guarantees."
In Breed v. Jones,15 respondent Jones was the subject of a petition filed
on February 9, 1971, in Los Angeles Juvenile Court which alleged that
Jones, at the age of 17, had committed acts which if done by an adult
would constitute the crime of robbery.'6 The petition was sustained at the
adjudicatory hearing. Two weeks later, at a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found Jones not amenable to its facilities and ordered his prose-

cution as an adult.
Respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the juvenile
court alleging that his prosecution as an adult would violate the double
jeopardy clause. The juvenile court as well as the California Court of
Appeal denied the petition. 8 Respondent was then tried and convicted of
robbery in the first degree and was committed to the California Youth
Authority.
In December of 1971 Jones filed a habeas corpus petition in federal
district court again alleging that jeopardy had attached to the juvenile
court's adjudicatory hearing. The district court'9 denied the petition statprecept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put
an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding. Id. at 545.
The Court concluded that the injection of juries into the juvenile system "would bring with
it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary
system and, possibly, the public trial." Id. at 550.
14. If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed
upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps
that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined
to give impetus to it. Id. at 551.
Thus, the Court intimated its intention to continue with its balancing approach in determining the applicability of constitutional guarantees to juvenile proceedings.
15. 95 S. Ct. 1179 (1975).
16. The petition alleged that Jones was a person described by CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 602 (West 1966):
Any person under the age of 21 years who violates any law of this State or of the United
States or any ordinance of any city or county of this State defining crime ... is within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of
the court.
17. "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) the
Supreme Court ruled that this provision is applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
18. In re Gary Steven J., 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971). Jones' petition for
hearing before the Supreme Court of California was also denied.
19. Jones v. Breed, 343 F. Supp. 690 (C.D. Cal. 1972).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:201

ing that since the adjudicatory hearing "was but one step in a comprehensive program developed . . . for the handling of delinquent youth" no
jeopardy had then attached."0
The Ninth Circuit"' reversed, ruling that "[w]hen the juvenile court
can, on the basis of the delinquency hearing, impose severe restrictions
upon the juvenile's liberty . . . jeopardy attaches."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the prosecution
of respondent in adult court subsequent to his adjudicatory hearing subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments."
The Court first determined the importance to the juvenile of the double
jeopardy prohibition by examining what negative effects were being manifested by the deprivation of the right. The Court noted that "[j]eopardy
denotes risk"2 and risk is inherent in juvenile proceedings since "in terms
of potential consequences there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory
hearing . . . from a traditional criminal prosecution." 5 The Court reasoned that since respondent "was subjected to the burden of two trials for
the same offense . . . he was twice put to the task of marshaling his
resources against those of the State, twice subjected to the 'heavy personal
strain' which such an experience represents.""0
The Court found no merit in the "continuing jeopardy" argument ac20. Id. at 691. Moreover, the court reasoned that even if jeopardy did attach to the preliminary proceedings in juvenile court, "it is clear that no new jeopardy arose by the juvenile
proceeding sending the case to the criminal court." Id. at 692. This ruling was based on the
assumption that since respondent faced only one punishment for the offense, he was merely
subjected to a "continuing jeopardy" until a final disposition of the case was attained.
21. Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974).
22. Id. at 1165. The court rejected the "continuing jeopardy" theory since respondent was
not the party to initiate the "appeal" of the juvenile court decision:
[Tihe trial in adult court does not follow as a result of an appeal taken by the minor
from his juvenile court conviction, but is a retrial for the same offense initiated by the
state. Continuing jeopardy allows retrial following an appeal initiated by the defendant
claiming error in his first conviction. Id. at 1167.
The court concluded that the "juvenile courts are a separate court system from the adult
courts .

. . ."

and although the juvenile faces only one punishment, "double jeopardy pro-

tects double risk of conviction, not just double risk of punishment." Id.
23. See note 17 supra.
24. 95 S. Ct. at 1785.
25. Id. at 1786. Citing Gault and Winship, the Court compared the type of incarceration
and stigma the juvenile faces to the type a criminal defendant faces and found the two to be
virtually identical. Id. See note 8 supra.
26. Id. at 1787. See also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (separate opinion).

19751

RECENT DECISIONS

cepted by the district court,2 stating that although the proceedings against
Jones had not run the entire course contemplated by the California Welfare and Institutions Code, any final disposition in accordance with the
statute would deprive respondent "of the constitutional protection against
a second trial."
Having determined that the denial of double jeopardy protection placed
significant burdens upon the juvenile, the Court, under the second stage
of its analysis, considered the impact that the imposition of the guarantee
would have on the juvenile system.2 The Court found that only one procedural change in the California juvenile system would have to be effectuated to comply with the constitutional mandate. That is, the juvenile
court would, in most cases, have to conduct its transfer hearing"' prior to
its adjudicatory hearing. Since the transfer hearing is merely dispositional,
i.e., the juvenile faces no threat of incarceration as a direct result thereof,
no jeopardy then attaches.3
In assessing the burden of having the transfer hearing precede the adjudicatory hearing, the Court noted that duplicative proceedings may result
where transfer to the criminal system is rejected. 2 This duplicative bur27. See note 20 supra.
28. 95 S. Ct. 1788. Moreover, the Court noted that the Holmesian view of "continuing
jeopardy" which would permit another trial has "never been adopted by a majority of this
Court." Id. See notes 20 and 22 supra.
29. In order for the guarantee to be held inapplicable, the burdens it would place on the
juvenile system must outweigh the juvenile's hardship of facing two trials. 95 S. Ct. at 1788.
30. The transfer or waiver hearing is the juvenile court proceeding at which it is determined
whether the child is amenable to the care and treatment offered by the juvenile system. The
finding is necessary when, due to the minor's age, concurrent jurisdiction is vested in the
juvenile and adult systems, with primary jurisdiction resting with the former. If the court
finds the child not suited to the juvenile system, it will waive jurisdiction to the adult court,
as was done with respondent Jones at his dispositional hearing.
Recognizing the critical nature of such transfer hearings, the Court in Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), mandated the application of certain due process guarantees to
such hearings. The Court ruled that a hearing must be held to decide transfer and, upon
reaching a decision, the juvenile court must issue a statement of reasons supporting its ruling.
The juvenile was also afforded the right to counsel at such hearings and a right of access to
any social or probation records compiled concerning him. Id. at 557.
31. See Brown v. Cox, 481 F.2d 622, 631 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136
(1974) quoting from State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Iowa 1972).
32. 95 S. Ct. 1790. Duplication would come about because similar evidence may be presented at both the transfer and adjudicatory hearings. As a result of this similarity of evidence, the Court noted that "the nature of the evidence considered at a transfer hearing
may in some States require that, if transfer is rejected, a different judge preside at the adjudicatory hearing." Id. at 1790-91. However, the Court added that "nothing decided today
forecloses States from requiring, as a prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial
evidence that he committed the offense charged, so long as the showing required is not made
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den, however, "will tend to be offset somewhat by the cases in which,
because of transfer, no further proceedings in Juvenile Court are required. '33 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that once transfer has been
rejected, "juveniles may well be more likely to admit the commission of
the offense charged, thereby obviating the need for adjudicatory hearings,
than if transfer remains a possibility. '34 Finally, the Court found that the
new procedural requirement will, in all likelihood, serve to facilitate the
implementation of the juvenile system's goals by decreasing the "adversary wariness" manifest at adjudicatory hearings where transfer has yet to
be decided.One important reservation was made by the Court:
We intimate no views concerning the constitutional validity of transfer following the attachment of jeopardy at an adjudicatory hearing where the
information which forms the predicate for the transfer decision could not, by
the exercise of due diligence, reasonably have been obtained previously.
The Court, then, envisioned the possibility of new evidence being discov-

ered at the adjudicatory hearing of a nature so as to demand the juvenile's
transfer to adult court. In deferring a ruling on such a transfer, the Court
implied its potential validity for reasons of "manifest necessity"."

in an adjudicatory proceeding." Id. at 1790 n.18.
33. Id. at 1790.
34. Id. In light of the type of incarceration a juvenile faces within the system, see notes 8
and 25 supra, it seems unlikely that the rejection of transfer will serve as a major incentive
for juvenile confessions.
35. Knowledge of the risk of transfer after an adjudicatory hearing can only undermine the potential for informality and cooperation which was intended to be the
hallmark of the juvenile court system. Rather than concerning themselves with the
matter at hand, establishing innocence or seeking a disposition best suited to individual correctional needs, the juvenile and his attorney are pressed into a posture of
adversary wariness that is conducive to neither. 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
36. Id. at 1790 n.20.
37. The Court cited Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), where respondent was
brought to criminal trial under a fatally defective indictment. The trial judge, after the jury
were impaneled and sworn but prior to the hearing of any evidence, declared a mistrial over
respondent's objection. In affirming respondent's subsequent prosecution and conviction, the
Court stated:
[W]here the declaration of a mistrial implements a reasonable state policy and aborts
a proceeding that at best would have produced a verdict that could have been upset
at will by one of the parties, the defendant's interest in proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and equally legitimate demand for public justice. Id. at 471.
Arguably, the interest of vindicating public justice could forge an exception to the juvenile's
double jeopardy protection where previously undiscovered evidence of criminal behavior related to the acts alleged in the delinquency petition surfaces during the adjudicatory hearing.
That is, it seems likely that in such a case the juvenile court could halt the adjudicatory
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The Court concluded that the prosecution of respondent in adult court
after a juvenile adjudicatory hearing "violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.""5 At first glance, this ruling seems to be yet another step
toward the "ultimate disillusionment" with the juvenile system envisioned
in McKeiver 9 A deeper consideration of this decision suggests the opposite. Had the Court desired to sound the death knell of the juvenile system,
it would not have so vigorously employed its two-tiered, benefit/burden
analysis. Moreover, the findings which resulted from this analysis were so
clearly one-sided that the Court unanimously arrived at its decision almost
out of necessity."
Since this ruling was almost pre-determined, the import of the decision
is demonstrated by the manner in which it was reached. The Court's detailed analysis reaffirms that it is not yet willing to merge the criminal and
juvenile systems because it recognizes that youthful offenders need the
special care, treatment, and judicial flexibility the juvenile courts can
offer. The Court has tenaciously maintained that the juvenile system,
through judicially guided reform, can feasibly meet its original goals. This
decision is yet one more incentive toward that end.
S.M.D.V.
hearing, initiate a transfer hearing, and subsequently waive jurisdiction to the adult court
without violating the juvenile's constitutional rights. Cf. note 29 supra.

38. 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
39. 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971). See note 14 supra.
40. Previous courts have reached the same result: Lewis v. Howard, 374 F. Supp. 446 (W.D.
Va.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1974); Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973); Garrison
v. Jennings, 529 P.2d 536 (Okla. Crim. 1974); M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 4 Cal.
3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971). Moreover, a growing number of states have
enacted statutes requiring that the waiver hearing precede the adjudicatory hearing. See
Rudstein, Double Jeopardyin Juvenile Proceedings,14 WM. &MARYL. REV. 266, 299 (1972).
Prior to the application of the double jeopardy clause to the states, see note 17 supra, a
few courts held that the prosecution of a juvenile following an adjudicatory hearing violated
fundamental fairness and due process: Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (Sth Cir. 1968); Sawyer
v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965); Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App.
1963).

